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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
K E N T F . F U L L E R , a minor 
appearing by and through 
C O N N I E J . F U L L E R , his 
guardian ad litem, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, I ^ ^ 
vs. ( 13905 
Z I N I K S P O R T I N G GOODS 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
and T H O M A S E. FOLKMAN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE 
This is a civil action brought by plaintiff against 
defendants for damages arising out of the detention, 
arrest, incarceration and prosecution of plaintiff by 
defendants. Plaintiff's contends that he was illegally 
and without probable cause detained, arrested and 
charged with and prosecuted for the crime of shop-
lifting at Zinik's store in Salt Lake City. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
The matter was tried to a jury and verdicts of 
No Cause of Action (R. 150-153) were returned on 
the issues of malicious prosecution, false arrest, and 
false imprisonment. 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial (R. 145), 
based upon (1) the refusal of the trial court to grant 
plaintiff's Motion for Directed Verdict at the close of 
the evidence on the issue of liability as to false arrest 
and false imprisonment, and (2) refusal of the trial 
court to instruct the jury, as requested by plaintiff, that 
the burden of proof to show reasonable and probable 
cause for plaintiff's detention and arrest under Sections 
77-13-30 and 77-13-32, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended 1959, was the burden of defendants. The Mo-
tion for New Trial was denied. 
R E L I E F SOUGHT ON A P P E A L 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Judgment on Ver-
dict entered in this matter and of the Order denying the 
Motion for New Trial, and requests that the matter be 
remanded to the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County for a new trial. Plaintiff requests 
that this Court hold as a matter of law that defendants 
are liable to plaintiff in damages for false imprisonment 
and false arrest and that, as to those issues, the sole issue 
to submit for trial on remand should be that of damages. 
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S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S 
At approximate 2:00 P.M. on a warm afternoon 
on August 14, 1973, plaintiff came into downtown S^lt 
Lake City on his motorbike (R. 7) for shopping pur-
poses. He parked his vehicle on Main Street and en-
tered the business premises of Zinik Sporting Goods 
Company. He carried his helmet with him (R. 8), 
since to leave it with the vehicle is an open invitation to 
theft. The chin strap was connected, and he carried the 
helmet with the strap as he proceeded to the rear of the 
store where the sporting goods were displayed. H e 
was wearing cut-off Levis and a "tank top", which is 
a type of a slip-on shirt not having sleeves (R. 8, 10). 
At the time, there were very few customers in the 
store, particularly in the sporting goods section, and sev-
eral clerks were standing around with little to do (R. 
23). Plaintiff stopped at a display counter featuring 
mountain climbing equipment, where he picked up a 
karabiner (R. 13), and was examining it and other 
mountain climbing equipment. A karabiner is a light 
weight object approximately 2V2 inches long and 
IV2 inches wide, shaped and looking like a y% inch chain 
link, and having a spring arrangement which permits 
a portion of the link to open. It is inserted into the eye 
of metal wedges driven into rocks, and a climber can 
then tie to or string his rope through the karabiner. The 
item retails for about $2.00. 
One of the store's clerks approached the plaintiff 
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and, with the karabiner in his hand (R. 14), the plaintiff 
and the clerk went to another nearby display stand 
where plaintiff selected a waterbag which his mother 
had requested that he purchase (R. 17). The two of 
them then went to the check counter, which was central-
ly located just slightly to the rear of the center of the 
store (See Exhibit 1-P, which shows the location of the 
various store areas and the route of plaintiff while in 
the store). While making payment for the waterbag 
plaintiff placed the karabiner in his helmet and put 
the helmet on the floor against the check counter rather 
than on the high narrow ledge of the check counter, 
since helmets are oval and tend to roll around when 
they are set down (R. 16, 17). The karabiner was 
placed upon two or three flat packets of photo prints 
which plaintiff had previously paid for at another busi-
ness establishment, and which were lying flat in the 
bottom of the helmet (R. 15, 42). The clerk inquired 
of plaintiff if there was anything else that he wanted 
and he answered "Not for awhile", and that he was com-
paring some things (R. 18). The water bag was then 
put in a sack, which plaintiff held in his hand. 
Plaintiff thereupon picked up his helmet and re-
traced his route toward the back of the store and went 
to the same area containing the mountain climbing 
equipment and a contiguous section of the store contain-
ing a display of bows and arrows (R. 19). 
In the meantime, defendant Folkman, assistant 
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manager of the store, had received a phone call from an 
employee, Richard Bringhurst, that there was a "pos-
sible" shoplifter (R. 80, 100) in the store. Folkman 
came down the elevator from an upstairs office, checked 
with one of the employees to determine which person 
they were watching, and walked to the main door at the 
front entrance to the store (R. 100). The store had no 
rear entrance available to customers. 
After waiting three or four minutes at the main 
door, Folkman re-traced his steps and approached plain-
tiff as he was standing in the bow and arrow section 
looking at a display (R. 101) and stated "Where's the 
karabiner? Empty your pockets." (R. 102). 
Plaintiff held his helmet out towards Folkman (R. 
21, 49), but he was required to separately empty each 
of his pockets. Folkman personally examined plain-
tiff's rear pockets (R. 102). Thereupon, Folkman 
looked into the helmet and saw the karabiner, which lay 
against the sloping edge of the helmet and alongside the 
film packets. The degree to which the karabiner was 
visible was the subject of a conflict in the evidence, but 
there was no question on the part of any witness as to the 
fact that it was visible (R. 19, 50, 111, 112, 116, 117). 
Folkman took the karabiner, made a comment that 
". . . that was concealment, . . ." and proceeded to 
take plaintiff into a back room of the store (R. 102). He 
made no contact after plaintiff's detention with any of 
the other store employees, although plaintiff testified 
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that one of them came by at the time of his detention and 
made a comment that he had seen plaintiff put the kara-
biner in his pocket (R. 21, 51, 56). At least one em-
ployee did, however, follow them to the back room of 
the store and stood outside the door (R. 64). 
Folkman then proceeded to telephone the police 
and, after a police officer arrived and the proper formal-
ities were had, Folkman advised plaintiff that he was 
under arrest (R. 113). Prior thereto, and while the 
two of them were in the back room, plaintiff explained 
to Folkman that he intended to purchase the karabiner 
and inquired as to why he could not pay for it (R. 103). 
At the time he had approximately $7.00 in his posses-
sion, a checking account with a balance of approximate-
ly $1,000.00, and his family maintained an account at 
Zinik's (R. 24, 46). 
The police officer, after Folkman had made the 
formal arrest, forced the plaintiff to stand up against 
the wall of the rear room, frisked him, and handcuffed 
his hands behind his back (R. 22). The officer, accom-
panied by Folkman, led the plaintiff through the store 
and out the front entrance onto Main Street, where he 
was placed in a police car and taken to the local jail. H e 
was booked, finger-printed, mugged (photographed), 
and his possessions were checked (R. 24, 25). H e was 
assured that his motor bike would be removed and 
placed in safe keeping, but it was allowed to remain on 
Main Street during the remainder of that day and the 
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night, until plaintiff recovered it the next morning. 
Plaintiff was held in jail until 11:00 o'clock that night, 
at which time his father returned from out-of-town and 
posted bail (R. 25). 
Folkman swore out a complaint in City Court, and 
left (R. 103, 113). Subsequently, the matter came to 
trial on the criminal charge of larceny, and Judge Maur-
ice Jones, sitting without a jury, found plaintiff Not 
Guilty. I t further developed that plaintiff had "never 
done anything of this type in his life" (R. 104), and, on 
cross-examination, that he had never been arrested be-
fore (R. 25). 
Subsequent to the city court trial, plaintiff brought 
action, through his mother as guardian ad litem, since 
he was only 18 years of age, for false imprisonment, 
false arrest, and malicious prosecution. 
A R G U M E N T 
I. 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D IN REFUS-
I N G TO G R A N T P L A I N T I F F S MOTION F O R 
A D I R E C T E D V E R D I C T AS TO L I A B I L I T Y 
FOR H I S D E T E N T I O N A N D A R R E S T . 
It is the position of plaintiff that under the law and 
applicable statutes there was no legal basis or reason-
able cause for (1) detaining plaintiff in defendant Zin-
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ik's store in the first instance, and (2) even if such de-
tention was lawful, there was no legal basis or probable 
cause for thereafter causing plaintiff to be arrested, 
placed in jail, and submitted to a criminal charge of lar-
ceny. Accordingly, issue is taken with the refusal of the 
trial court to grant plaintiff's Motion for Directed Ver-
dict (R. 120) on the issue of liability which was made 
at the conclusion of the evidence taken in the trial. 
The analysis of this matter should properly be 
made into two parts:: Whether defendant Folkman was 
justified in accosting and detaining plaintiff in the first 
instance and, if so, was he further justified in thereafter 
detaining plaintiff and causing his arrest and incarcer-
ation. 
(a) Defendants did not have reasonable and prob-
able ground to detain plaintiff as a matter of law. 
Section 77-13-30, Utah Code Annotated, as 
Amended 1957, sets forth the Utah Statutory law per-
taining to the detention of persons suspected of shop-
lifting : 
"A peace officer, or a merchant, a merchant's 
employee, servant or agent, who has reasonable 
and probable ground for believing that goods 
held or displayed for sale by the merchant have 
been taken by a person with intent to steal may, 
for the purpose of investigating such unlawful 
act and attempting to effect a recovery of said 
goods, detain such person in a reasonable manner 
for a reasonable length of time." 
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Whether defendant Folkman had reasonable and 
probable ground to believe that plaintiff intended to 
steal the karabiner should be tested by examining the 
evidence. The full extent of Folkman's information 
pertaining to the matter involved an inter-office phone 
call from employee Richard Bringhurst (R. 80, 89), in-
forming him that "We had a possible shoplifter" in the 
store and ". . . please come down now." Folkman then 
related that he came down the elevator to the main floor 
and, in his own words (R. 100) "Checked with one of 
the employees to see which person it was they were 
watching. Then I walked to the main door in the front, 
the entrance to the store.' 
Folkman then indicated that he watched plaintiff 
as he was standing in the aisle by the bow and arrow 
display, while Folkman was still down at the front of 
the store, — 
" . . . and I gave him about three or four minutes 
to kind of, you know, make up his mind whether 
he was going to put it back or buy it, . . ." 
The evidence is completely devoid of any other informa-
tion having been conveyed to Folkman at that point, 
although someone must have also told him that a kara-
biner was involved as indicated by his statement made 
at the time of his subsequent contact with the plaintiff. 
At any rate, Richard Bringhurst, at the time of the 
phone call, didn't tell Folkman that the item was in 
plaintiff's pocket; in fact, Folkman testified that "He 
didn't even tell me what the item was." 
9 
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Inasmuch as Folkman went to the front door of the 
store to observe plaintiff, and since he at that time rec-
ognized that plaintiff had the option of ". . . mak(ing) 
up his mind whether he was going to put it back or buy 
it, . . / ' , what possible rule of law or reason should dic-
tate that plaintiff be required to make that decision 
within a period of time consisting of three or four min-
utes? If store customers don't make a purchase within 
such a period of time, are they expected to leave the 
store, notwithstanding that they have been invited into 
the establishment for business purposes? By his admis-
sion, Folkman clearly realized that plaintiff had an op-
tion and, by not accosting plaintiff immediately upon 
stepping off the elevator, it appears clear that Folkman 
recognized that any detention at that point would have 
been premature and unauthorized. 
What, then, transpired to change the situation after 
the lapse of three or four minutes? The answer is — 
nothing. Plaintiff was quietly standing in the area be-
tween the bow and arrow display and the mountain 
climbing equipment counter, and he hadn't made any 
movement of any kind which would indicate that he 
planned to move toward the exit of the store. In fact, 
his position at that time was considerably to the rear of 
the check counter, also. 
Some states, with statutes similar to ours, contain 
an additional provision covering situations of this type. 
The Ohio statute (Section 2935.041 Revised Code) set 
10 
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forth in the case of Isaiah v. Great A. and P. Tea Com-
pany, 174 N E 2d 128, 86 A.L.R. 2d 430, contains such 
a provision: 
"Such detention, however, shall not be lawful un-
less the person to be detained has left the con-
fines of the establishment but is within the im-
mediate vicinity thereof; or, where the establish-
ment is of the self-service type, the person to be 
detained has passed the cashier's counter." 
Although Utah's statute contains no such provision, 
it is submitted that reasonable minds, considering Folk-
man's conduct and admissions, would have to agree that, 
in the absence of any overt action on the part of plain-
tiff, there was no reasonable ground to accost and de-
tain plaintiff after the lapse of three or four minutes or 
any other length of time. 
In support of the foregoing argument it is well to 
note that under statutory provisions similar to those in 
Utah, a person making a detention and/or arrest is held 
to the objective standard of a reasonable prudent man. 
Authorities for this principle will be set forth in the next 
section of the brief. The important thing is that the 
test is not that of the subjective suspicion in the mind of 
the store employee. As stated at 47 A.L.R. 3rd, page 
1002 — 
"•'"."•. . mere suspicion that a person is shoplifting 
is insufficient to create probable cause for deten-
tion under a shoplifting statute, . . ." 
11 
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A further view of the situation which was evident 
to defendant Folkman immediately prior to making the 
detention and arrest reveals that there was a very logi-
cal alternative available other than the course which was 
followed. Folkman admitted on cross examination that 
the plaintiff entered the store alone and that there was 
really no need to make the detention and arrest at the 
time, at the place, and in the manner which he utilized. 
Q. The store wasn't overly crowded at around 
2:00 o'clock that afternoon with customers? 
A. No, sir, it was not. 
Q. Apparently there were ample personnel to 
watch what Kent was doing? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And there would have been ample personnel 
to have waited until he did or didn't go towards 
the door with this item? 
A. That's true. 
Q. And you so testified at the criminal trial, didn't 
you? 
A. That's right, there was plenty of people watch-
ing him. 
Q. H e didn't come into the store with a group of 
boys, did he? 
A. No, sir, he did not. 
12 
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Q. He was all alone? 
A. Um-hum. 
(R 107) 
Applying an objective standard of a reasonable 
prudent man, what justification existed for detaining 
and arresting the plaintiff who was in the act of shop-
ping at a point near the rear of the store — and to the 
rear of the check-out counter, and who had given no in-
dication of leaving the store with the item involved? 
Folkman had the alternative of waiting to determine 
whether the plaintiff was going to purchase the item or 
put it back on the counter; further^ he was blocking the 
exit to the store and had ample assistance at all times to 
resolve the matter of whether plaintiff might eventually 
take any merchandise belonging to defendants. 
Plaintiff submits that his initial detention, under 
the undisputed facts and viewed from the objective 
standard of a reasonable prudent man, was unreasonable 
and illegal as a matter of law. 
(b) Defendants did not have reasonable and prob-
able ground to arrest plaintiff and cause his incarcera-
tion as a matter of law. 
If it be assumed, arguendo, that Folkman had 
some reasonable ground for detaining plaintiff in the 
first instance, it is submitted that no reasoable and prob-
able ground existed for his continued detention, arrest 
13 
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and incarceration. Our Utah statute pertaining to this 
aspect of the matter is Section 77-13-32, Utah Code An-
notaten, 1957, relating to the liability of one causing a 
detention or arrest for suspected larceny: 
"A peace officer or a merchant, merchant's em-
ployee, servant or agent who causes such deten-
tion of a person as provided in Section 77-13-30, 
or who causes the arrest of a person for larceny 
of goods held or displayed for sale shall not be 
criminally or civilly liable where the peace offi-
cer, or merchant, merchant's employee, servant 
or agent has reasonable and probable ground for 
believing that the person detained or arrested 
committed larceny of goods held or displayed for 
sale." 
Although Folkman indicated that Bringhurst ". . . 
didn't even tell me what the item was", he accosted 
plaintiff and said, "Where's the karabiner? Empty 
your pockets." (R. 102). After requiring plaintiff to 
empty his front pockets, Folkman personally felt the 
back pockets (R. 102), found nothing, and looked into 
the helmet, which was extended to him. Folkman initi-
ally testified that plaintiff lifted the pictures to reveal 
the karabiner (R. 102), but further inquiry into the mat-
ter revealed a considerably different situation. On cross-
examination Folkman admitted: 
Q. At the criminal trial didn't you state that it was 
in view but partially hidden on edge? 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
14 
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Q. In any event, this karabiner could be seen vis-
ibly in the helmet? 
A. If you call about one-thirty-second of a whole 
item showing, yes, sir, it was. . . ." 
(R. I l l , 112) 
Plaintiff's testimony concerning the visibility of the 
karabiner in the helmet, as given on rebuttal examina-
tion, was as follows: 
A. Yes. He testified that he could see the kara-
biner, that it was on edge. He testified in 
(city) court to that. 
Q. Say it again; he testified what? 
A. That he could see the karabiner and that it was 
on edge. He showed the karabiner on edge 
to the judge, and more than half of it was 
showing. 
Q. Did you see him show this to the judge? 
A. Yes, I did. 
(R. 116, 117) 
At two points in the cross-examination plaintiff re-
sponded: 
Q. You didn't reach in and bring them out? 
15 
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A. H e (Folkman) just saw right in it without me 
moving anything. 
Q. He looked in and the karabiner was under-
neath the film in your helmet ? 
A. No. I t had slipped and was on the side against 
the wall of the helmet. 
(R. 50) 
BY MR. L A U C H N O R : 
Q. Kent, this karabiner was on edge when Mr. 
Folkman showed it to the judge, illustrating 
the way the karabiner was when you lifted the 
film packages, is that right? 
A. When I what? 
Q. When you lifted the film packages? 
A. I never lifted the film packages. 
Q. Who did lift the film packages? 
A. Nobody. 
Q. Are you saying up at the store nobody ever 
lifted the film packages from the karabiner? 
A. No, I never said anybody did. 
Q. Are you saying you didn't? 
A. They didn't lift. 
16 
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Q. And you didn't either? 
A. No. 
Q. I t was up on top? 
A. Yes, on its side. 
(R. 117) 
Whatever version one wishes to accept concerning 
the degree of visibility of the karabiner in the helmet 
which plaintiff was carrying by the chin strip, the essen-
tial fact remains that a portion of the item was visible 
under everyone's view of the evidence. Further, with-
out making any check with other employees in the store, 
Folkman proceeded with plaintiff's arrest and called 
the police. 
Our Utah statute absolves an employee from civil 
liability if reasonable and probable ground exists for be-
lieving the person arrested committed larceny of the 
goods. Folkman, by his own admission, had encoun-
tered similar situations where he had detained persons, 
and anyone in his position must certainly be familiar — 
and we think the statute implicitly so requires — with 
the basic requirements of establishing a criminal cause 
of action for larceny. How can reasonable minds be-
lieve that this store manager, with his knowledge of such 
situations, and having in effect falsely accused plaintiff 
of having the item concealed in his pockets, ever except 
to secure a criminal conviction under the circumstances ? 
17 
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Further, let us look at the surrounding circumstances 
existing at the time, and of which Folkman was certain-
ly cognizant: 
..... I . Plaintiff was shopping alone — not in a typi-
cal gang having lookouts and "shields"; 
2. There were practically no other shoppers in 
that section of the store at the time — a sharp 
contrast to crowded stores where "easy-pick-
ing" is more likely; 
3. There were at least three store employees, in 
addition to Folkman, who had nothing better 
to do than to monitor plaintiff's movements — 
hardly a situation encouraging shoplifting; 
4. Plaintiff had purchased one item, and still had 
approximately $7.00 cash in his possession to 
purchase the $2.00 karabiner had he so desired; 
and he could have also put the item on his fam-
ily's charge account. 
5. I t would have been easy for defendants, with 
adequate personnel having little to do, to have 
resolved the entire matter by waiting until 
plaintiff might have proceeded out of the store, 
or onto the street, before detaining him (R. 
107). 
Reasonable minds would suggest that Folkman 
18 
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would have certainly had a discussion with his other em-
ployees before railroading plaintiff into jail in view of 
the scant information he had and the mistake he made in 
first requiring plaintiff to empty his pockets. An an-
notation found at 47 A.L.R. 3rd 991 and following, 
clearly sets forth the rule that "reasonable grounds" and 
"probable cause" mean the same thing, and that the 
standard to be applied to one making an arrest of this 
type is the objective standard of "the reasonable pru-
dent man", as contained in the referenced case of Cob-
lyn v. Kennedy's Inc., (Mass.) 268 N E 2d 860, 47 
A.L.R. 3rd 991. I t was pointed out that anything less 
than such an objective standard would invite intrusions 
upon constitutionally guaranteed rights, further noting 
that the objective standard applies to cases involving 
malicious prosecution and false arrest. 
The annotation at 47 A.L.R. 3rd, page 1002, con-
tains the following comments: 
"Some . . . courts have further held that under 
this rule, mere suspicion that a person is shop-
lifting is insufficient to create probable cause for 
detention under a shoplifting statute, . . ." 
Further: 
"I t is apparent, therefore, that it behooves the 
merchant to investigate the beliefs and suspicions 
of other parties before acting thereon, and in-
deed, the failure of the merchant to properly at-
tempt to confirm or disprove his suspicions, or 
those of others, by reasonable investigation, has 
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been held in several cases to be a significant fac-
tor in determining the existence or non-existence 
of probable cause." 
At page 1008 a sub-topic considers the necessity of 
conducting reasonable investigation before detaining a 
suspected shoplifter: 
"The issue of whether or not the detaining per-
son conducted a reasonable investigation to con-
firm his suspicions or beliefs before arresting the 
suspect has, in some situations, been considered 
relevant in determining whether the detention 
was based upon probable cause. Failure to con-
duct such inquiry has been considered an import-
ant factor in determining that insufficient cause 
existed for detaining a suspected shoplifter . . ." 
At page 1019 of the annotation the situation con-
fronting Folkman at this point is stated concisely: 
". . . that once the goods have been recovered 
the next step which the law contemplated on be-
half of the shopkeeper was either to liberate the 
person apprehended under the statute or to 
call the police so that due process could begin. 
Thus, by detaining the customer beyond this 
point, the store lost its privilege under the 
statute, . . ." 
The annotation beginning at 47 A.L.R. 3rd 991 
contains many references to factual situations involving 
variations of shoplifting problems, and this Court can 
excerpt any further pertinent provisions contained in 
the annotation which may lend help to a decision of this 
case. 
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Since defendant Folkman at no time made contact 
with other store employees other than to receive a phone 
call from Bringhurst and to check with another em-
ployee upon reaching the floor of the store as to which 
person was being watched, the Mississippi case of J . C. 
Penney Co. v. Cox (1963), 246 Miss. 1, 148 So. 2d 679 
would be quite appropriate. In that case it was held 
that probable cause for the detention of a suspected 
shoplifter had not been established where the detaining 
person acted only upon the fact that someone in the store 
had told one of the clerks that he believed the suspect 
had stolen something, the clerk then relaying the accu-
sation to the assistant manager of the store, who carried 
out the detention. The court flatly stated that probable 
cause cannot be based upon mere belief of a third per-
son that somebody did or did not do something. 
Let us next examine the evidence to ascertain 
whether reasonable and probable ground for arrest 
would have existed had Folkman in fact checked with 
his employees. The employee first giving the "210 
alert" was Charlie Spicer, who observed plaintiff exam-
ining the karabiner prior to making the waterbag pur-
chase, and who stated (R. 70) that, ". . . as I watched, 
he put the karabiner under his shirt." Spicer then, on 
cross examination (R. 74), stated that plaintiff "rolled 
his shirt like this (indicating)." He further stated that 
(R. 75, 76), ". . . he took this and rolled up his shirt and 
stuck it underneath." 
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Had Folkman called Spicer to the scene, and had 
he looked at plaintiff and observed that his levi's had no 
belt (R. 114) and that the T-type shirt was untucked 
and hanging over (R. 115 — and see Exhibit 3-P), it 
would have hardly supported Folkman's later observa-
tion at trial (R. 109) that Spicer ". . . didn't say it quite 
right," and that what "We meant by tucked under his 
shirt . . . was tucked in his pants with his shirt covering 
the pants." 
If we next go to Richard Bringhurst, Folkman 
would have received another conflicting story since he 
testified that, subsequent to the timp Spicer allegedly 
saw the plaintiff tuck the karabiner under his shirt, the 
plaintiff, while holding the helmet in his arm at rib-cage 
height (R. 85, 86), lifted the end of the envelopes in his 
helmet and put the karabiner under them. He stated 
that he previously saw the plaintiff with the karabiner 
in his hand (R. 86). 
In answer to a question inquiring as to whether 
such an obvious attempt to conceal an item by holding 
the helmet up for view and visibly revealing the item to 
be tucked under the envelopes was unusual, contrasted 
to the slight-of-hand movement that one would normally 
expect of someone secreting such an object, Bringhurst 
did allow (R. 91) that he would admit that ". . . Kent 
was pretty careless." 
It is submitted that had Folkman checked Spicer's 
absolutely conflicting story of the taking of the kara-
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biner with that of Bringhurst, coupled with his own still 
different version that it was in one of plaintiff's pock-
ets, any reasonable prudent man, utilizing an objective 
standard and considering the other facts at his disposal, 
would have certainly realized that maintaining a crim-
inal charge against plaintiff was comfjpletely out of the 
question. 
Plaintiff submits that under our Utah statute and 
applicable law, coupled with the undisputed facts, de-
fendants had no reasonable and probable ground for 
further detaining, arresting and incarcerating plaintiff 
as a matter of law. 
I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT COMMITTED P R E -
J U D I C I A L E R R O R IN R E F U S I N G TO IN-
STRUCT T H E J U R Y T H A T T H E B U R D E N 
OF P R O O F TO E S T A B L I S H R E A S O N A B L E 
A N D P R O B A B L E CAUSE FOR P L A I N T I F F ' S 
D E T E N T I O N A N D A R R E S T W A S U P O N D E -
F E N D A N T S . 
Defendant's Third Defense to plaintiff's Com-
plaint (R. 215) affirmatively asserted that reasonable 
and probable grounds existed for detaining plaintiff, 
and that his detention was reasonable and lawful. In 
effect the defense set forth the same matter contained 
in the foregoing quoted statutory provisions. A de-
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fense of this type, both under the statute and at common 
law, imposes the burden of proof upon the defendants to 
show reasonable and probable cause under an objective 
standard. 
When the Instructions were being discussed for 
submission to the jury, plaintiff submitted the follow-
ing instruction relating to burden of proof (R. 127) : 
"You are instructed that whether or not the de-
fendant had reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe that plaintiff had committed larceny at 
the time and place in question depends on 
whether a reasonable and prudent man in his po-
sition would be justified in believing facts which 
would warrant making the arrest. In order for 
the defendant to justify the arrest, you must find 
by a preponderance of the evidence that he had 
reasonable and probable grounds for believing 
that plaintiff has committed said offense. The 
burden of proof on all other propositions is on 
the plaintiff. 
The court refused to give the foregoing Instruction 
or any other Instruction remotely suggesting that de-
fendants had the burden of proving reasonable and 
probable cause for detaining and/or arresting plaintiff. 
In fact, an examination of Instructions li (false impris-
onment), 15 (malicious prosecution) and 19 (false ar-
rest) (R. 169, 170, 174). will reveal that those instruc-
tions were all negative in form, that they placed all bur-
dens of proof on plaintiff, and that they left no room for 
any thought that the burden of proof in justification for 
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plaintiff's arrest and detention was on defendants. In-
structions 8 and 9 (R. 164) were the general instructions 
given by the Court placing the burden of proof upon 
plaintiff. 
If there is any question that the burden of proof 
was actually placed on plaintiff to establish that defend-
ants did not have reasonable and probable ground for 
the arrest which was ra^ade, Instruction 19 resolves any 
such argument: 
"You are instructed that if you find from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that at the time that 
the defendants arrested plaintiff, defendants did 
not have reasonable or probable grounds for be-
lieving that plaintiff had committed larceny, then 
you are instructed that defendants are respons-
ible for making a false arrest. . . . " (R. 174) 
Plaintiff took Exception (R. 127) to the refusal of 
the trial Court to give his requested instruction and ex-
tensively argued the matter in his Motion for New Trial 
(R. 145), which was denied. 
The law is clear that the defense of reasonable and 
probable cause in the detention and/or arrest of a sus-
pected shoplifter is upon the one asserting such defense. 
32 Am. Jur 2nd, False Imprisonment, Section 7 at page 
79, states the general proposition: 
"It is frequently held or recognized that the want 
of probable cause is not an essential element of 
the action for false imprisonment. It is also 
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sometimes stated that the presence of probable 
cause is not a defense to the action. Nevertheless, 
the question of probable cause becomes material 
in a false imprisonment case where the issue is 
justification for an arrest or detention without a 
warrant or where the defense is that the defend-
ant was acting in protection of his person or 
property. The question also becomes material, 
as a mitigating factor, where punitive damages 
are sought. 
"Where it is material, the question of probable 
cause is a mixed one of law and fact. The court 
submits the evidence of it to the jury with in-
structions as to what will amount to probable 
cause, if proved. If the facts are undisputed, the 
question is one of law to be determined by the 
court." 
The same citation, paragraph 101 at page 150, 
deals with the matter of burden of proof in unequivocal 
language: 
"The burden of proof is upon the defendant to 
justify the arrest or imprisonment by showing 
that i t was effected under lawful authority, in-
cluding the existence of probable cause therefor, 
where probable cause is a factor." 
The annotation at 47 A.L.R. 3rd at page 1004 
states the basic rule applicable to false imprisonment ac-
tions (which include the same elements as false impris-
onment and arrest): 
"As is the case in false imprisonment action gen-
erally, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff 
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to show that he was indeed detained against his 
will. The burden then shifts to the defendant 
to show that the detention was justified. If a 
merchant intends to rely on a statute which per-
mits detention of suspected shoplifters, he must, 
of course, show that he comes within the purview 
of the statute, and then, according to the provi-
sions contained therein, must show that his de-
tention of the plaintiff was based upon probable 
cause, and that the detention was carried out in 
a reasonable manner and for a reasonable time." 
The previously referenced case of Isaiah v. Great 
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Compamj also clealt with the 
matter of burden of proof in situations involving statu-
tory provisions dealing with probable cause. There the 
court also held that a jury instruction which placed the 
burden of proof on the defendant to show that there was 
a probable cause for detention was not erroneous and 
that the burden was upon the defense to show that a 
state of facts existed which justified making an arrest. 
Iliis writer has found no case involving statutory 
provisions such as we have in Utah which departs from 
the principle that the burden of proving reasonable and 
probable cause for one's detention and/or arrest lies 
anywhere other than with the one making the detention 
and/or arrest. In this case the jury should have been so 
instructed because the real issue in the case involved jus-
tification since the facts surrounding the detention and 
arrest otherwise provided all of the elempnts constitut-
ing the cause of action. To refuse to instruct the jury 
that the burden of justification was on the defendants 
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effectively reversed the entire burden of proof situation. 
Nor was the matter assisted by the giving of Instruc-
tions 10, 11 and 12 which merely recited the statute and 
referred to the phrase "reasonable and probable ground" 
in general terms and without setting forth any standard 
of proof or that the proof was upon the defendants to 
establish the same. In any event, Instruction 19 sealed 
the matter against plaintiff. 
Defendants may argue in their brief, as was done 
when argument was had on the Motion for New Trial, 
that the jury must have understood that the burden of 
proof to show justification for the detention and arrest 
was upon the defendants notwithstanding the failure of 
an instruction to cover the issue. But this argument is 
rather superficial in view of the consistent position 
throughout the instructions placing the burden of proof 
upon plaintiff. If the matter of burden of proof has no 
place in civil litigation, then the court should speak out 
on the matter and it should be removed from the list of 
stock instructions if juries are so finely tuned as to be 
aware of what the law is. But jurors are not lawyers, 
and the refusal of the court to place the burden of proof 
to show justification for the detention and arrest upon 
defendants was germane to the entire case and to the 
most critical issue before the jury. The fact that the 
jury returned a verdict of No Cause of Action can only 
be justified by a finding that justification existed for 
making the detention and arrest. Thus, the burden of 
proof was critical to the verdict. 
28 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the actual trial of litigated cases, where trial 
lawyers 11iiist convince juries, the matter of burden of 
proof becomes very important. Without a proper in-
struction on the burden of proof the boundaries of argu-
ment to a jury are limited. I t is one thing to argue the 
strength of one's own case and to point out that the bur-
den of proof has been mel, but in a case of this type the 
strength of one's argument can be much greater by 
pointing out to the jury, in accordance with the instruc-
tions, that the burden of proof to show justification for 
the detention and arrest is upon the defendants and that 
they have failed in critical particulars to sustain that 
burden. Lacking such an instruction the plaintiff must 
argue in much more general terms and must convince 
the jury by the total strength of his own case, burdened 
with the further problem of trying to make an argument 
which is negative in nature to offset what should 1»;ive 
been the affirmative argument of the opposition. 
SUMMARY 
To affirm the type of conduct evidenced in this 
matter creates disturbing implications for the simjple 
reason that any person in any retail establishment who is 
in Hie ael of shopping, and who places an arlieie v.\ an 
open handbag, helmet or other receptacle, is subject to 
being detained, arrested and thrown into jail without 
realistic recourse against the offender. This sobering 
realization reaches each of us since, at some time in ev-
eryone's shopping experience and under almost identi-
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cal facts, any of us could have been thrown into jail. 
Under the facts present in this situation the failure of a 
court to direct a verdict as a matter of law or, worse 
still, to fail to unequixocally instruct the jury that the 
burden of proof in justification of the detention and 
arrest was upon the defendants, constitutes a clear denial 
of due process of law as guaranteed by the 14th Amend-
ment to the U. S. Constitution. 
The argument which the defendants will probably 
raise again — as it was raised during the trial, claiming 
that plaintiff did not strenuously object to his initial de-
tention, either by physical remonstrance or by what 
would have been wasted talk, further illustrates the 
high-handed nature of this occurrence. Perhaps, if 
plaintiff had been skilled in the art of shoplifting he 
would have had ready answers to furnish at the time of 
his detention; on the other hand, had he been a skilled 
shoplifter and somewhat knowledgeable in the ways of 
the law, he would have certainly said nothing and stood 
on his legal rights. But to suggest some standard of 
conduct to an 18-year-old minor to follow after his de-
tention which might satisfy soirte hindsight test peculiar 
to the whims of defendants is ridiculous. Plaintiff had 
never been arrested in his life or charged with any ac-
tivity of this type, he was gainfully employed and was 
a student at the University of Utah, and — we can as-
sume, properly taught to respect the property of others. 
The shock, humiliation, and bewilderment of being 
detained, arrested, frisked, handcuffed, and taken 
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through the streets and placed in jail, with all of its at-
tendant unpleasant effects, is an experience which hard-
ly promotes rational thought or action — particularly as 
to an 18-year old minor. Not only does sudh conduct 
violate due process of law under the 14th Amendment, 
it constitutes a clear violation of plaintiff's rights under 
the Civil Rights Act (Title 42, Sec. 1983, U.S.C.A.) : 
"Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the dep-
rivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress." 
Perhaps if one wishes to judge this case by holding 
that reasonable and probable cause for detaining and 
arresting one in the act of shopping exists simply be-
cause the shopper happens to have a motorcycle helmet 
in his hand, then it might be possible to jiistify defend-
ants' actions, Hopefully, however, justice has come to 
the point where such tests are no longer valid — and no 
such test should be applied to this case. Mere suspicion 
has no place in the law. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should 
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hold, as a matter of law, that no reasonable and prob-
able cause existed for the detention and arrest of plain-
tiff in this matter and that, as to all other issues, the case 
should be remianded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
G L E N E. F U L L E R 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
15 East 4th South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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